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abstract: This interpretive article relies on insights from three
critical literatures – world-systems analysis, postcolonial
studies and, to the extent of an extended simile, the economic
sociology of flexible global production – to propose a geo-
political understanding of what the European Union (EU) is.
The authors begin by interrogating the tendency within
much of the current research and commentary on the EU to
treat it as a state of sorts. They then outline some mechanisms
– pertaining to its internal and external linkage structures –
that have enabled the EU to perform successfully in a geo-
political context where most of the main actors are states.
Finally, drawing on critical insights from the sociology of
subcontracted production and distributed organization, the
authors suggest ways in which the EU, in its current form,
might be thought of beyond the constraints of the current
theoretical language of statehood.
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Not a State
The history of West European integration presents numerous instances of
disunity, posturing and contentious bargaining. And yet, the introduction
and apparent success of the common currency – the euro – seems to have
in effect marginalized the view, not uncommon in earlier writing, that the
EU is ‘just’ a customs union or an intergovernmental organization.
Notwithstanding the continued appeal of observations such as ‘the
member states of the EU have with surprising success defended their
positions as the masters of their economy’ (Streeck, 1996: 65), or that the
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EU continues to be ‘characterised by a . . . dualism between supranational
European law and intergovernmental European policy-making’ (Scharpf,
1996: 15) – an image of the EU as a unified, single entity, very much like
a state, has come to dominate the literature. This is so even though, as
Philippe Schmitter (1996b: 133–8) has recently shown, statehood is clearly
only one of the logically possible outcomes of political integration in
Western Europe. There is, of course, much disagreement about what kind
of a (quasi-)state the EU is or could be (federal-supranational or confed-
erate-intergovernmental, unified-single-layer or multi-level, centralized
or decentralized, etc.). There is even a dispute regarding whether the EU
represents a meaningful unit of analysis at all (Stone-Sweet and Sand-
holtz, 1998; Caporaso et al., 1997) – a point to which we return at the end
of this article. It is also clear that, in general, ‘states are not the exclusive
and may no longer be the predominant actors in the regional/inter-
national system’ (Schmitter, 1996a: 6). Yet, the conceptual tools and the
emphases in the literature on the EU reveal at least an implicit proclivity
to seeing the EU through the looking-glass of the West European state.
This is coupled with and, in our view, partly explained by, a nearly
universal tendency in the literature on the EU to disregard the external
aspects of the EU’s structural features and its behaviour that might help
shed light on the specificity of the EU as a geopolitical entity.
At first glance, the ‘state’ analogy seems to work reasonably well. The
EU holds regular elections and its Parliament routinely issues ‘laws’ and
‘regulations’ – all commonly the preserve of the state. It has a powerful
bureaucracy in the Weberian sense, and even carefully crafted insti-
tutional narratives commonly referred to as the EU’s official ‘policies’ (e.g.
trade, competition, finance). The EU’s daunting output in legal materials
– the Acquis Communautaire – is by and large adhered to, both within the
EU and outside it. It has a central body – the Commission – whose
organizational components, the Directorates-General, are assigned tasks
whose distribution shows some strong resemblance to the responsibilities
of ministries in the government of any modern state. The Commission’s
recent president, Romano Prodi, has repeatedly reinforced that analogy
by referring to the Commission as just that: the EU’s ‘government’. The
EU also has a Council, serving as a collective presidency. It has a Court
of Justice and a Central Bank, with the latter safeguarding the stability of
a common currency that has been, since early 2002, the sole legal tender
in the wealthiest and most powerful 12 of the 25 member states as of
mid-2004. The EU has no provisions for expelling member states, and
even the question of suspension only emerged in the context of ‘eastern
enlargement’, as recently as the Amsterdam Summit of 1997. An EU-wide
institutionalized political mechanism has recently produced a legal text
referred to as ‘the Constitution’, awaiting ratification by the member states.
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The EU also maintains embassies abroad and regularly signs treaties with
states. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the EU commands a certain
geopolitical weight – as manifested in its ability to both influence its
immediate environment and project its power to the world outside – that
is matched only by a handful of actors on the world scene, all of whom
are states. Given those features, the EU is, clearly, some kind of a public
authority that looks, in some important respects, like a state.
There is, however, one crucial aspect of the EU’s organization that sets
it fundamentally apart from a conventionally defined state: the EU has
no executive apparatus. While the Commission may be referred to as the
government of the EU, the reference remains merely metaphorical since
the EU has no executive machinery2 below the level of the Directorates-
General. According to the definition prevalent since Max Weber, a state
is that organization that has a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence
within a given territory. The EU, in contrast, has no such monopoly over
the use of legitimate violence; indeed, it has practically no means of
coercion of its own at all, except for the recently established, but not nearly
fully operational, Rapid Reaction Force, whose command structures and
tasks are as yet unfinalized. Consequently, as was clear during a political
stalemate in 2000 – inaugurated by the accession to power of a ultra-
right-wing coalition government in Austria, which the other European
governments deemed ideologically undemocratic and, hence, politically
unacceptable3 – the EU has no exclusionary provisions, and in fact almost
no institutional arrangements for disciplining and punishing member
states for purported misbehaviour. It thus lacks a capacity to act
autonomously vis-à-vis actors, within its own area of jurisdiction or
outside. As we see it, given this crucial absence in terms of executive
abilities, the EU simply cannot qualify as a state as conceived by conven-
tional definitions of statehood.
One might of course argue that there are other states, in the postcolonial
or post-state-socialist third world for instance, whose executive appara-
tuses have been so undermined by various political and economic crises
that they have ceased to function adequately as states. The EU, however,
is not such a case of diminished state capacity whose executive apparatus
has been destroyed, or is powerless vis-à-vis external forces. What distin-
guishes the EU, in our reading, is that it has never had – nor has it ever
sought to develop – any executive apparatus to speak of and, yet, it func-
tions quite effectively, and it wields considerable global power.
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Public Authority without an Apparatus:
Enforcement via Linkages
How, then, does the EU achieve the remarkable success of having its
Acquis generally adhered to by actors both inside and outside the EU?
More importantly, how does the EU as a non-state accomplish the most
important geopolitical requirement of shaping its international environ-
ment, made up of states, to its advantage? How, in other words, can public
authority function without a monopoly over the means of coercion? On
close scrutiny, what emerges is an elaborate system that involves four
main mechanisms through which the EU achieves execution of the Acquis
and manages to project its power to its environment: apparatuses of the
member states, intergovernmental organizations, the process of ‘eastern
enlargement’ and, finally, the workings of transnational corporations. In
the following section of the article, we consider a little more closely each
of these mechanisms/apparatuses through which the EU functions.
Apparatuses of the Member States
First, the Acquis is executed, and the EU’s geopolitical interests are
furthered, by the state apparatuses of the member states. Full member-
ship in the EU implies that the member state must carry out the Acquis
as its own law. This of course presents a set of political difficulties as the
legitimacy structures of the member states are radically different from that
of the EU’s various legislative and regulatory bodies. In this sense, the
famously elegant official formula used widely to describe the EU as an
organization ‘sharing and pooling of the member states’ sovereignty’4
denotes a contractual relationship in which the EU is ‘riding on the back’
of the member states, becoming in effect a meta-state itself.
A meta-state, however, is not a state. The executive functions of a state
rest on a crucial link between legislative authority and legitimating
powers provided by the collective body of citizens. The lack of an execu-
tive apparatus puts the EU always at a one-step removed relationship
from the source of legitimacy, introducing a radical, often unbridgeable
gap in what is an extremely complex and sensitive relationship between
citizenries and the legislative and executive apparatuses of ‘their’ state.
The consistent tendency of West European voters to turn out in elections
for the European Parliament in proportions significantly smaller than for
the legislative organs of their own states – a gap of an average magnitude
of 24.4 percent,5 ranging6 between 2.9 percent (Ireland) and 10.4 percent
(Lithuania) to 53.4 percent (Slovakia) and 42.5 percent (Sweden) – is just
one, tangible expression of the thinness of the EU’s legitimacy as a meta-
state. Much of the anti-EU rhetoric and political activism in Western
Europe today, coming especially from the extreme right, exploits that
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 2
156
03 Böröcz R (bc-d)  27/4/05  3:54 pm  Page 156
distance and the widespread concern among the citizens of the current
member states with it. This removal also contributes to substantiating the
charges that the EU is an undemocratic institution.
Intergovernmental Organizations
A second, and even more interesting mechanism through which the EU
manages to wield its considerable power, especially over the world
outside its boundaries, is by virtue of the concurrent membership of its
member states in such intergovernmental organizations and strategic
alliances as the WTO, the IMF, the EBRD, the WEU, the OSCE, the UN
and its myriad specialized agencies, and NATO. Military capacity is among
the most significant executive functions of states, and it is obviously
crucial for the projection of the international power of large polities. How
a public authority’s defence is organized is, therefore, of prime relevance
to understanding its nature.
As it turns out, the bulk of what counts as the EU’s global, strategic
defence takes place under the aegis of NATO: that is, a set of institutional
mechanisms that is far from, indeed much bigger than, a simple deriva-
tive of the ‘sharing and pooling’ of the member states’ respective military
and related apparatuses. The fact that NATO provides de facto defence
to the EU is made possible by, but by no means follows simply from, the
fact that many EU member states also happen to be members of NATO.
Rather, the arrangement comes with deep historical roots in the Cold War,
and is one of the clearest indicators of the EU’s origins in that 45-year
long bipolar geopolitical standoff. The EU, thus, successfully transfers –
one might even say, subcontracts out – to NATO, albeit via its member
states, one of the key functions of statehood: defence. This is a truly
remarkable arrangement: the EU’s external defence is provided (and to a
certain extent paid for) by an organization that neither the EU itself nor
its member states control, indicating the existence of a particularly strong
set of geopolitical ties between the North American and West European
nodes of economic and political interests in the contemporary world
system – a point we revisit shortly.
‘Eastern Enlargement’
A third distinctive mechanism through which the EU achieves adherence
to the Acquis is its project of ‘eastern enlargement’, whereby the legal auth-
ority of the EU is inserted into the states located on the EU’s immediate
eastern and southeastern perimeter. A crucial precondition for application
for full membership, and one of the key criteria according to which the
applicant states have repeatedly been evaluated, is transposition and
implementation of the EU’s Acquis (see, for example, Böröcz, 2000; Kovács
and Kabachnik, 2001; Kovács, 2001). The applicant states have accepted
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this imposition of direct legal authority, and the attendant relinquishment
of sovereignty to a foreign authority, in exchange for associate member-
ship in the EU that is widely recognized to be asymmetrically benefiting
the EU in both economic and geopolitical terms, and what seemed at the
time as some vague promise of full membership in the unforeseeable
future.
It is crucial here to distinguish ‘eastern enlargement’ from the concept
of accession, which refers to the eventual act of an applicant state formally
joining the EU as a full member so that it is granted the appropriate number
of seats in the EU’s Commission, Council, Parliament and other organs.
‘Eastern enlargement’ may not result in accession, as the states and societies
of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey (invited to join the process of ‘eastern
enlargement’ along with the other 10 applicants in the mid-1990s but
barred from accession in the 2004 round) have recently learnt first-hand.
Accession ought to be distinguished, further, from full inclusion, which
involves the extension of equal union-wide rights to all citizens of the
member states. Formal accession does not necessarily mean full inclusion;
the reluctance of most existing member states to open up their economy
for East European labour7 has ensured that the full spectrum of the rights
involved in EU citizenship (including the right to free movement, settle-
ment and work) will be extended to the citizens of the states that achieved
formal accession in the 2004 round only after an additional seven years.
Needless to say, no such restrictions apply to EU labour or capital from
the existing member states, should they seek entry into the ‘eastern appli-
cant’ countries, with the exception of some restrictions on the immediate
purchase of East European agricultural land by EU-based agribusiness.
Meanwhile, since implementation of the Acquis is a precondition for
becoming a serious applicant in ‘eastern enlargement’, i.e. its implemen-
tation by default precedes accession by several years, the applicant states
are exposed to the pressures of having to undertake all substantive
responsibilities of membership, especially in the realm of opening their
borders for EU capital, without any of the rights of full membership.
Although membership involves dues payments – an obligation the appli-
cants avoid until accession – the subsidy flows and badly needed infra-
structural funds from the EU’s various development funds are expected
to represent an amount many times higher than dues. The longer the
waiting time between the onset of ‘eastern enlargement’ and the
completion of full accession, the more likely that the attendant ‘interim’
imbalances will become intrinsic to the very structures of these societies,
especially since such imbalances are the hallmark of the East European
history of capitalism.
Such structural conditions of dependence on a foreign authority for
laws and regulations make the situation of East European applicant states
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somewhat similar to that of ‘dependencies’, ‘protectorates’ and a form of
externally supervised government reminiscent of the history of colonial
empires’ ‘indirect rule’. In the case of the EU–Eastern Europe relationship,
the weight of external authority in Eastern Europe has been particularly
pronounced in the area of economic policy. For the entrants during the
2004 round of accessions (who will enjoy equal rights within the EU by
2011), this quasi-dependency status will have lasted for 18 years. For next-
round members Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey – optimistically assuming
only a five-year delay – it can be expected to be circa 23 years (see also
Böröcz, 2003).
Transnational Corporations
To put a very complex web of interconnections simply, the EU has been,
clearly, a joint project of some key segments of the ruling classes of
Western Europe and North America (see, for example, van der Pijl, 1984;
Arrighi et al., 1999: 138–40; Anderson, 1997: 57–63) throughout its history;
so much so that scholars have recently begun speaking about ‘transat-
lantic governance’, a separate and clearly identifiable institution of the
contemporary global economy (see, for example, Pollack and Schaffer,
2001). An EU-watchdog non-governmental organization has recently
warned8 that the EU and the USA, under lobbying influence by multi-
national corporations active on both continents, have begun extended
negotiations concerning the construction of a North Atlantic free trade
area and customs union. The power of these lobbying efforts is illustrated
by the fact that, at one of its last sessions before the 2004 elections, the
European Parliament adopted a resolution that calls for ‘the launching of
a 10-year Action Plan aimed at deepening and broadening the trans-
atlantic market, as well as the transatlantic economy and monetary
cooperation, with the goal of a barrier-free transatlantic market by 2015’.9
The EU represents an ‘elite pact’ between some of the world’s most
powerful business organizations – the transnational corporations based
and/or active in Western Europe – and the group Bornschier and
Ziltener (1999: 35–6) call the ‘political entrepreneurs’ of the Brussels
centre. As part of this pact, the EU provides EU-based transnationals
with economic space and other kinds of comparative advantage. In
exchange, the EU enjoys adherence to the Acquis and projects its power
partly by way of the worldwide activities of the West European trans-
nationals. The pronounced role of the transnationals in producing
economic dependence, including technological, financial and trade
dependence and the transformation and appropriation of the property
structures, has been widely documented in the literature on economic
development. (For excellent summaries, see Gereffi, 1994; McMichael,
1996; Sampat, 2003.)
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The recent transformation of the economies of the EU’s former state-
socialist neighbours provides a particularly good illustration for the
creation of this kind of dependence not only through foreign direct invest-
ment, trade and technological means, but also by way of the forced transfer
of regulations, the systematic influencing of economic policy, as well as
legislation on military, border policing, educational, health and other social
issues, irrespective of whether they are part of the EU’s competencies.
During the last period of their state-socialist history, the societies of
East-Central Europe experienced a rather unique system of external
linkages described as dual dependency (Böröcz, 1992a, 1992b, 1993). This
structure emerged as the result of a number of parallel processes, among
which the introduction of partial market elements in their economic
system in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, the turn of their states to subsidiz-
ing the private consumption of non-essential commodities, and the pres-
sures experienced by their states due to the global explosion of fossil fuel
energy prices (on which their economies were very heavily dependent)
may have been the most significant. While the Moscow centre of the state-
socialist world continued to maintain a firm geopolitical authority over
them, the societies of East-Central Europe also came increasingly under
a peculiarly late state-socialist form of economic dependence on western
capital, primarily in the form of a fast escalating indebtedness (Andor and
Summers, 1998: 8–16). The collapse of state socialism in the late 1980s
involved the gradual, disciplined self-removal of the Soviet geopolitical
grip over Eastern Europe (hence releasing one of the two prongs of their
dual dependency) and, with it, the last remaining institutional vestiges of
society-wide social protection mechanisms, inherited from the state-
socialist period (Ferge, 1997; Thoma, 1998; Bereti, 2003). Partly because of
their already existing linkages of dependence on West European-based
transnational finance capital, and partly due to the power of the new
geopolitical logic created by the single unified and ever deepening West
European integration, the societies of East-Central Europe quickly fell into
a situation of a new kind of intense, singular dependence on the EU. Much
of the modern history of Eastern Europe is, of course, that of dependence
on various West European states. In this sense, post-state-socialist depen-
dency is unique only in two regards: in its intensity, and the fact that the
West European location – the central object of Eastern Europe’s depen-
dence – is more unified than ever, presenting them with a situation of
intense dependency on a singular, locally hegemonic actor that is unprece-
dented in the region’s history.
Late state-socialist debt dependence was soon converted into trade and
investment dependence, and by the time the EU’s new applicant states
came within arm’s length of the Union, they were already profoundly
transformed into export-oriented, second-tier service and manufacturing
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sites, with their collapsed state-socialist industries reconstructed almost
exclusively by foreign capital, under spectacular tax breaks, to produce
primarily for the EU market.10 By the time of the first round of formal
accession in 2004, West European manufacturing transnationals had
established joint control with finance capital over the process of valoriz-
ing the resources of the former state-socialist economies on the EU’s
eastern perimeter.
The concept of external economic dependence was developed initially
to conceptualize Latin America’s economic, political and social histories
in the 1960s and 1970s.11 However, the analogy between Latin America
and Eastern Europe goes only so far, since the US – Latin America’s main
regional metropole – is a state in the Weberian sense, possibly the most
powerful hegemonic state of the post-Second World War period of the
world economy; the EU – Eastern Europe’s metropole – on the other hand,
is not a state but an evolving, in many respects rather elusive, public auth-
ority with an economic and geopolitical power that is comparable to that
of the US, but without direct access to comparable means of coercion,
which functions through a set of highly complex but flexible, subcon-
tracting mechanisms that we outlined earlier. In the closing section of this
article, we turn to an analysis of this flexible nature of the EU’s linkages
and assess some of its possible implications.
The Centrality of External Linkages
One persistent tendency in the literature on the EU, especially in the
debate carried on mostly by political scientists over the nature of the EU
– whether it is a ‘federative’ or ‘confederative’ structure – is to focus
exclusively within. In this, that debate shares the shortcomings of the
‘sharing and pooling of sovereignty’ formula that we have already
discussed. The EU, in such a formulation, is imagined as a product of
some kind of summation of its parts. Discussions that follow from that
assumption therefore only articulate those precise institutional and legal
conditions that would realize that imagined summation.
Our reading of the EU, however, points to an urgent need to situate the
EU within a wider, global context.12 For, three of the four key institutional
mechanisms we discussed earlier, through which the EU accomplishes 
the execution of its Acquis and achieves the internal and external stability
necessary for the high-profitability, high-remuneration, service- and
technology-intensive form of accumulation in which its economies
specialize, involve actors, processes, structural conditions and conse-
quences outside the EU itself. Those external actors, processes and struc-
tures are not incidental to the EU’s functioning; they are the pillars on
which it rests.
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There is perhaps an even more compelling, deeply historical reason for
contextualizing the EU globally in order to understand just what it is. One
of the least evoked aspects of the EU is the historical role of its member
states and their predecessors in creating the most fundamental structures
of the world commonly known as the world economy and the interstate
system today. The states that constituted the EU at the turn of the 21st
century are the same states that had exercised imperial rule over nearly
half of the inhabitable surface of the globe outside Europe just two to three
generations ago. As recently as the early 1930s, their colonial possessions
amounted to nearly three-quarters of all the foreign territorial holdings in
the world and covered almost half of the inhabited surface of the world
outside Europe. Table 1 summarizes some data relevant to this point.13
A number of significant historical corollaries follow from the connec-
tions summarized in this simple table. First, this is a reminder that the
EU is the historic heir to those states that have literally carved up the rest
of the world for centuries. As Michel Foucher (2001: 160) points out,
‘Outside of Europe, approximately 60 per cent of the borders of current
envelopes are of external origin not having been drawn by the states
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 2
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Table 1 Overseas Possessions of the Member States of the EU (as of 2002) in 1878,
1913–14, 1933 and 1939
1878a 1913a 1914b 1933a 1939b
Land area of colonial possessions 38,627 57,196 55,392 57,533 36,206
by predecessors of current EU
member states (000 km2)
Land area of colonial possessions 31.1% 46.1% 44.6% 46.3% 29.2%
by predecessors of current EU
member states as percentage 
of inhabited surface of the 
globe outside Europec
Land area held by predecessors 57.8% 73.4% 73.6%
of today’s EU member states  
as percentage of world total
territorial holdingsd
a Computed from Clark (1936: 23–4, Table I) by summing the ‘mandates’, ‘dependencies’ and
‘self-governing territories’ of the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain.
b Computed from Ansprenger (1989), who is quoting Veit (1915) for the 1914 data.
c The total land surface of the globe is 148,941,000 km2. From this, we subtracted the area of
uninhabited Antarctica (14,235,000 km2) and Europe (10,507,630 km2). This leaves
124,198,370 km2 inhabited territory outside Europe. Source: Hammond (1913).
d Computed from Clark (1936: 32, Table IV, ‘Percentages of Territorial Holdings of the Western
Powers’) by subtracting from the cells ‘Total Western Holdings’ in ‘World Total’ the ‘United
States’ in ‘World Total’ and ‘International Areas’ in ‘World Total’.
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adjoining them today.’ Nearly 40 percent of those lines (Foucher, 2001:
160) have been drawn by the British and French imperial powers alone.
This, of course, also applies within Europe so that, for instance, practi-
cally all current borderlines in Central and Eastern Europe have been
drafted by West European imperial powers as part of the dissolution and
reorganization of various local empires
The history of modern West European-centred empires and coloniality
– i.e. the very history of capitalism and modern statehood worldwide – is
but the history of the long-term exploitation of the extra-European societies
subjected to the imperial pursuits of a handful of West European states and
agents acting on their behalf. The EU’s reliance on external actors, processes
and structures today has, therefore, a powerful history behind it: the West
European imperial states’ matter-of-fact subjugation and exploitation of
actors, processes and structural conditions outside Europe. That history
works both as a system of path dependence (limiting actors’ ability to take
new directions) and as an institutional component of global hegemony: a
storehouse of inherited sociocultural patterns of thinking about, and behav-
iour concerning, ‘Europe’, the rest of the world and that very distinction.
If seen as an organization that ‘shares and pools’ its member states’ sover-
eignty, then the EU should also be recognized as sharing and pooling its
member states’ historical record of imperialism and colonial extraction
from the rest of the world.
Second, the history of empire and colonialism continues to be of
enormous economic, political, cultural, moral and geopolitical signifi-
cance. The existence and character of the imperial-colonial ties constitute
the single most potent variable that explains the early emergence of some
West European states to a position of global power. The most powerful
current consequence of that history is the remarkably advantageous
subsequent position the societies of Western Europe enjoy in the world
economy today. That position of economic advantage and international
power is, in turn, a defining aspect of the EU’s daily reality, as well as a
key reason for its attractiveness to applicants for full membership. The
EU shares and pools in its member states’ colonial loot, and the appli-
cants are now asking for a share.
Third, the EU’s construction was coterminous not only with the begin-
nings of the Cold War, but also with the collapse of Western Europe’s
colonial empires. Evidence from French plans regarding the then-nascent
EU suggests that, at its inception in the 1950s, continued colonial engage-
ment was clearly understood as a compelling, constitutive element of the
idea of an intensifying West European integration. For instance, as
Jonathan Gosnell (2002) has recently pointed out, France’s role in the West
European association of states was matter-of-factly expected to involve
incorporation of France’s ‘special relationship’ with a large part of the
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extra-European world through the Union Française, i.e. France’s colonial
empire – a move that Aimé Césaire seems to have anticipated, in as early
as 1950, when he wrote his seminal Discourse on Colonialism (see Césaire,
2000) partly in response to emerging plans for a pan-West-European struc-
ture of integration, discussed in Western Europe as a future, benign struc-
ture of integration for Europe ‘after Nazism’.
The success of anti-colonial struggles, leading to the collapse of the
global system of colonial capitalism, prevented the creation of a pan-
West-European meta-empire that would have united the most powerful
West European imperial states, including their colonial empires, in a 
single West European colonial monolith. It would be both naive and ill-
informed, however, to claim that the EU’s current reality can be mean-
ingfully deciphered without taking into account the historicity of empire
– that is, the historical impact of empire on today’s world. The various
postcolonial ‘commonwealths’ are but concrete organizational reminders
of the existence of historically very long-lasting, unequal, neocolonial
relationships that keep large parts of the postcolonial ‘third world’ tied
to their former rulers in Europe in ever renewed bindings of dependence.
In this sense as well, the EU shares and pools its member states’ neo-
colonialist projects, including the blatantly asymmetrical links to their
former colonies – much of today’s ‘third world’.
The only aspects of this postcolonial dependence that enter into discus-
sions about the EU’s future are the Europe-bound human flows that have
resulted from those asymmetrical linkages and the involvement of the
wealthiest West European states in providing aid to their former colonies.
The massive, continued centripetal transfers of economic value, the after-
math of sustained political violence, imperial wars and genocide, the
ceaseless projection of military-strategic power through ‘spheres of
influence’, the ongoing destruction of the cultural, political, moral and
religious fibres of the formerly colonial, now formally independent
societies left often with little to no resources of their own, are conveniently
elided. If the former colonial ties are, clearly, relevant to immigration
policy,14 they must be relevant to all other areas as well – most signifi-
cant, perhaps, to the question of what the EU is.
Decolonization is hardly complete today. An online world atlas15
provides a list of 58 ‘dependencies and territories’ in the contemporary
world. Of those, 15 are still marked as ‘British’, nine are ‘French’, two
‘belong’ to Denmark and another two are marked as ‘Dutch’. Altogether
30, i.e. more than half of the world’s de facto dependencies today, are
under the direct control of colonial states that are members of the EU.
Because of its members’ continued involvement, the EU is undeniably in
the colonial business in the 400-year-old sense of the word as well. Any
accurate map of the EU would have to include such locations as, for
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example, the Virgin Islands and the Falklands, Martinique and Réunion,
Greenland and Aruba. In the light of the EU member states’ colonial past,
it is hardly surprising that the EU’s recent Commissioner for External
Affairs16 is none other than the last British colonial governor of Hong
Kong. The late 20th-century notion of West European state sovereignty
emerged in the context of an imperial world order, dominated by the
colonizing states of Western Europe. To the extent that the European
Union stands for the ‘sharing and pooling’ of the sovereignty of its
member states, it must also be seen as sharing in their remaining imperial
engagements, not to mention the inheritance from their past exploits.
Fourth, unless we assume the complete absence of any mechanism of
cross-generational transmission in the realm of collective experiences,
knowledges, mentalities – in short: cultures – we should expect that the
colonial history of the current EU member states, and empire’s role in
enabling the historical forces that have produced their current wealth,
power, privilege and claims of cultural superiority, should feature promi-
nently in the collective consciousness of the societies of Western Europe.
Of the total population of the EU in 2003, 90 percent were citizens of states
that appear in Table 1 as colonial powers. The EU is, thus, a centrally
important location for the continued articulation of those cultures, the
cultures of colonialism and empire.17
Finally, there is yet another imperial tradition that the societies included
in today’s EU bring with them: the historicity of land-based, contiguous
empires in Central Europe. If the history of the modern world-system is
the history of colonial empires, it is also the history of the complex,
multiple-actor strategic game of land-based empires marching forth and
retreating, dividing and redividing the territories of the less powerful
and/or smaller states among themselves, in their pursuit of land, popu-
lations and other strategic resources. The entire territory of Europe has
been affected by this process, including the central and eastern parts. The
four major actors in Central and Eastern Europe’s imperial history have
been the Habsburg, Ottoman, Prussian and Russian empires. The Ottoman
empire has been dissolved and replaced by secularist Turkey, currently a
much-ignored applicant for EU membership. The Russian empire was
reinvented, with a different project in mind, as the USSR, later to be
replaced by the Russian Federation, a global power with little formalized,
direct involvement in Central and West European affairs today, beyond
providing energy, raw materials and a military buffer zone on the east.
Two successor states of the centres of those empires – Germany and
Austria – are members of the EU, and the former state-socialist group of
the recent applicants for full EU membership (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia) consists entirely of states that have been built on,
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and with, the ruins of those empires during the 19th and 20th centuries.
The immediate relevance of this land-based type18 of imperial experience
for the EU’s role in the region thus cannot be exaggerated.
What, Then, Is the EU?
So, in what terms can we think about the EU, given this evidence? What
does this empirical phenomenon tell us about the nature of public auth-
ority and power?
If we evaluate the EU only in terms of the conventional Weberian
criterion of monopoly over legitimate means of coercion, we must dismiss
the idea that the EU is a state because of the absence of an executive appar-
atus, and hence the lack of means of coercion of its own. What it does
have is an extremely well-crafted, sophisticated system of linkages that
functions as a mechanism of distancing that produces the EU as a meta-
state. Therefore, in order to understand what the EU is, it may be
insufficient to focus, as is done conventionally, only on ‘Brussels’, i.e. on
union-level political and legal-regulatory processes. An alternative
analytical approach ought to consider all of the parties involved – the
member states, the European-based multinational corporations, the trans-
Atlantic ruling class interests, as well as the social, cultural, political and
economic dynamics of the pan-European political public at large, in
addition to ‘Brussels’ – in a single, intricately interwoven network clique
of actors with a set of shared geopolitical concerns and interests. The EU
is the centrepiece of this clique, a public authority that is, due to the char-
acter of its internal and external linkages, one step removed from sites of
coercion, the signifier of Weberian statehood.
The distance created by its meta-relationship with the member states
allows the EU to remain ‘clean’ in such matters that states muddle
through, often with much trouble. By contracting out the burden of strate-
gic defence to NATO, the EU can maintain an elegant and convenient
distance from matters of coercion without endangering its own defence.
In the process of ‘eastern enlargement’, much of the transformative ‘dirty’
work in the economies on the EU’s eastern and southeastern flanks is
done by the state apparatuses and the political elites of those societies
themselves. EU-based multinational companies do much of the coercive
work in the economic, environmental, social and legal realms worldwide,
without the EU itself ever having to utilize conventional tools of state-
based coercion. Surviving colonial ties, re-emerging relationships with the
historically dependent parts of the German and Austrian-dominated,
land-based European empires, and constantly renewed neocolonial
linkages to virtually the entire ‘former second’ and ‘third worlds’ provide
the EU with terms of exchange, raw materials, energy, labour, capital and
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services that continue to subsidize the EU’s accumulation process without
the EU ever having to get involved in the messy business of the social
and environmental violence associated with the extraction of surplus. To
a large extent precisely because of its distance from institutional locales
where direct coercion happens, the EU is widely portrayed as the epitome
of goodness in world politics today, reinforcing a centuries-old, Euro-
centric ideology of superiority. In promoting the ideology of ‘European
goodness’, the political process of European identity construction tries to
hide the corpse of colonialism while it continues, of course, to partake of
the material inheritance of the same colonialism.19
Coercion has been a crucial component of statehood because it can
produce order. However, monopoly over legitimate violence means that
modern states have to face demands for accountability – something that
other coercive organizations do not have to deal with. The absence of an
executive apparatus and hence the institutional setup for direct coercion
has entailed, in the case of the EU, the parallel absence of a tight system
of direct accountability not only to the citizens of the EU, but the rest of
the world as well, making it difficult for affected societies to hold the EU
legislative, and the economic and political coalitions behind it, responsible.
The EU’s elaborate system of distributing and subcontracting major
functions of authority and coercion, and the gap in the feedback loop of
accountability, can be fruitfully compared to contemporary organizations
of global economic production, especially the structures of flexible special-
ization (Piore and Sabel, 1984), network-governance (Powell and Smith-
Doerr, 1994) and just-in-time production,20 which often involve extremely
elaborate, multidimensional systems of subcontracting (Eccles, 1981; UN,
1981; Deyo, 1995). In our reading, much of what the EU has been doing
resonates very closely with the findings of recent macro-comparative
research on commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994),
especially the ‘buyer-driven’ type outlined by Gary Gereffi (1994), in
which an absentee merchant capital interest organizes the production
process, distributed to a large number of producers over complex, inter-
secting linkages in global geographical space, in an area of trade that is
very highly diversified and mercurial in terms of its demand structures.
Just as multinationals manage to lock in remarkably low labour costs and
at the same time avert accusations of unfair labour practices by setting
up elaborate systems of subcontracting, the EU has been able to remain
elegantly outside the purview of accountability with respect to the
processes of dependency and displacement that ensue from the activities
of actors who act on its behalf and in its interest.
The EU is, thus, a remarkably ingenious arrangement, realizing a core
dream of modern, West European liberalism: it is a generator of profit-
making and advantage-producing social change without any direct
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involvement in the unholy processes that lie beneath them. It would seem
that the spell of the ‘invisible hand’ is no longer restricted to the market;
it is now operating in the political realm as well. With approximately 6
percent of the world’s population, the EU of late 2003 registered about
one-third to one-quarter of the world’s GDP.21 Practically without lifting
a finger, it has managed to secure the compliance of almost all the post-
state-socialist states on its perimeter, transforming the region into the age-
old West European geopolitical dream of a buffer zone and a repository
of secure natural and social resources. With over half of the world’s
remaining colonies in its possession, and bound by a history of oppres-
sion, racism and systematic political violence, it is widely depicted as the
force of ultimate political goodness. Backed by the world’s only remain-
ing military superpower in NATO, a military-strategic organization
whose members together – roughly one-tenth of the world’s population
– command over half of the world’s GDP, it is able to project a self-image
that is neutral, peaceful, kind and gentle vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The task for sociology, if its practitioners wish to grasp the EU and the
phenomenon of escaping global accountability in general as social facts,
seems to be to go beyond the limits of the conventional theoretical formu-
lations of statehood. A certain new reality is already here: it is the burden
of theory to catch up with it.
Notes
The authors are grateful to Siba N. Grovogui, Attila Melegh and Patrick Ziltener
for some very useful conversation about the issues covered in this article, and
benefited from the comments by International Sociology’s anonymous reviewers. All
the usual disclaimers regarding the article’s remaining faults and omissions apply.
1. Part of the research for this project was executed, and an earlier version of the
article written while the first author was a visiting scholar at the Max Planck
Institute for the Analysis of Societies, Cologne.
2. The Bosnian city of Mostar, run directly by the EU, is the only exception to
this rule.
3. In early 2000, when an extreme-right, xenophobic party gained control over
half of the portfolios in the Austrian government in the first national elections
after Austria’s accession to the EU, all members of the EU put their bilateral
links with Austria on hold through 14 acts of bilateral boycott. Meanwhile,
EU Commission President Prodi sent a routine congratulatory telegram to the
new Austrian chancellor, in which he expressed his ‘certainty’ that the latter
would uphold the ‘common European values of liberty, democracy, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of the law’ and
assured him that he was ‘looking forward to a constructive working relation-
ship’ (EU official document IP/00/123) with Austria. The presence of similarly
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extreme-right and/or xenophobic parties in the various governments of 
other EU member states has not even elicited this much reaction from the EU
Commission.
4. The phrase is ubiquitous in official EU parlance. Some recent references
include Thomas Klestil (president of the Republic of Austria), at: www.
austria.org/press/prel0715b.htm; Chris Patten (until 2004, EU Commissioner
for External Affairs), at: www.publicservice.co.uk/pdf/europe/spring2003/
EU5%20Chris%20Patten%20ATL.pdf; Romano Prodi (until 2004, president of
the EU Commission), at: europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/
prodi/sp02_465.htm; and Jack Straw (British Foreign Secretary), at: europa.
eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth270701_en.htm (all references as of 5
December 2003.)
5. For the data, see www.idea.int/elections/voter_turnout_europe/images/
EPElections-Table1.pdf, for analysis, see www.idea.int/elections/voter_
turnout_europe/index.htm
6. Belgium and Luxembourg have been dropped from this comparison because
their electoral law prescribes and strictly enforces compulsory voter partici-
pation, i.e. their turnout data cannot be interpreted as expressions of substan-
tive electoral interest in determining the outcomes of the elections.
7. Of the 15 member previous member states, only the UK and Ireland – i.e. the
two member states that lie farthest away from Eastern Europe – opened their
labour market for citizens of the new member states in 2004.
8. www.corporateeurope.org/tpntabd.html as of 21 July 2004.
9. www.corporateeurope.org/tpntabd.html, referring to ‘Paragraph 17 in the
“European Parliament resolution on the state of the Transatlantic Partnership
on the eve of the EU-US Summit in Dublin on 25–26 June 2004” 
(P5_TA-PROV(2004)0375 – B5–0185/2004)’; at: www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/
sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2004–0375+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X as of 21 July 2004.
10. A detailed empirical demonstration of these points is beyond the scope of this
article. The sources quoted earlier, along with work by Adam Burgess (1997),
Böröcz (1999), Hannes Hofbauer and Andrea Komlosy (e.g. 1998), Hofbauer
(e.g. 2003), Hugo Radice (e.g. 1998) and Szalai Erzsébet (e.g. 1999) should
provide further pointers.
11. For excellent summaries of this literature, see, for example, Larrain (1989) or
So (1990).
12. For the basic formulations, and most powerful insights, of the literature on
global relations – the world-system approach – see, for instance, Wallerstein
(1974), Amin (1976), Arrighi (1996), Chase-Dunn (1998) and Arrighi and Silver
(1999).
13. Böröcz (2001) used this table to make a similar point, with a slightly different
emphasis.
14. On the significance of a history of previous penetration and the resulting
historicity of linkages for both migrant flows, policies regarding such flows
and the migrants’ contexts of reception, see Portes and Böröcz (1989).
15. at: www.worldatlas.com/dependtr.htm (accessed 3 May 2002).
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16. Chris Patten was a member of the Prodi Commission, whose term expired in
2004. In the negotiations after the 2004 elections, Patten’s name briefly appeared
as a possible new Commission president.
17. For an excellent, brief review, see Hall (1995: esp. 205–25).
18. For more on the distinction between detached (colonial) and contiguous (land-
based) empires, and its implications for constructions of otherness, see Böröcz
(2001).
19. We are grateful to Siba Grovogui for this metaphor.
20. Just-in-time production is a type of organizational design developed, first, 
for Toyota Corporation in the 1980s. As a management consulting website
indicates, it is an innovation that leads to high profitability by radically
‘decreas[ing] the time between customer order and shipment’ (at: 
rockfordconsulting.com/lean.htm, accessed 18 July 2004) as well as between
other points in the production–distribution process. Existing ‘just-in-time’
systems can span very large geographical distances (Prakash et al., n.d.). See
also McMichael (1996: 107).
21. Computed at current exchange rates from data presented in IBRD (2002).
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